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Ms Imrana Jalal
Chair, The Inspection Panel,
World Bank
1818 H St NW,
Mail Stop: MC10-1007
Washington, DC 20433, USA
Dear Ms Jalal,
By way of introduction I was one of the consultants to the Inspection Panel when it took up a complaint with respect to the Vishnugarh Pipalkoti hydel project (LOAN NO. 8078-IN and Report INSP/89109-IN) in Uttarakhand, India in 2012.
I had written to you earlier too in connection with my disagreement with the findings of the Panel which had ignored my arguments in its final report. My letter of protest dated 18.11.2015 is attached. Briefly, my principal disagreements were with respect to:
1) The so-called ‘cumulative’ impact assessment was only a ‘consolidated’ one and in complete violation of Bank Policy that required a Regional Environment Assessment for multiple projects.
2) In the above context, the emphasis in the consolidated assessment was on the impact of river bedloads on the project, and not on the impact of the project on the river and its ecology.
3) The impact assessment did not refer to mitigation measures for slurry leakages, slurry blowouts, and encounters with fractures and water while mining – all of which have great significance in the fragile Himalayan geology.
4) There was inadequate or missing analysis of benefits and losses, impact of transmission lines, fish biodiversity, climate change, roads, and reservoir effects.
However, the Panel ignored my protests and the Bank has continued to support the project. In the meantime, two disasters have taken place in the region that have been partly a consequence of the construction of the dams, as well as have threatened the dams themselves.
In the latest Fifth Progress Report to the Board on the implementation of the Management Action Plan. dated February 7, 2020, almost six years after the Panel incorrectly gave clearance to the project, it is reported that:
– Resettlement and Livelihood Restoration are still ongoing
– No progress has been made on the routing of the evacuation line for transmission of power
– The TBM linked to a slurry disposal plan was assembled and operational only from December 2019
– Implementation of the Uttarakhand Government’s river development study to mitigate the risk from future natural disasters is only now underway
As a consequence of the Inspection Panel’s wilful undermining of Bank policy, the Ministry of Environment here has been emboldened to give permission to construct another 7 hydropower projects in Uttarakhand, and THDC, builder of the Vishnugad Pipalkoti plant, has started to bulldoze the houses for construction of the project. This is being done despite vehement opposition on ground by the residents, despite an ongoing case in High Court on this project, and despite the ongoing case in Supreme Court on the larger policy issue with regards to the construction of dams in the Ganga basin.
I strongly recommend that the Inspection Panel under your able guidance should review both the findings in the 2014 report as well as the subsequent reports of Management with respect to carrying out the recommended measures over six years of constant delay and misreporting. It is time that the Bank withdrew its financing of such disastrous projects.
Sincerely
A K Roy
November 18, 2015
Respected Members of the Inspection Panel,
I am in receipt of the First Progress Report by Management on the Implementation of the VPHEP Action Plan in Response to the Inspection Panel’s Investigation Report.
Through this email I would like to express my acute sense of dismay at the entire process. I shall confine myself to the Cumulative Impact section for which I was retained as a consultant by the Panel.
In particular, I shall refer to the following documents:
1. The first draft of Chapter 4 on Cultural, Associated, and Cumulative Impacts prepared mainly by me (the part on Cultural impact was prepared by Dipak Gyawali) dated 29 August 2013 (referred henceforth as DR1).
2. The draft report prepared by the Panel Secretariat dated 28 February 2014, in which the cumulative impacts remain in Chapter 4, and with my comments sent on 10 March 2013 (henceforth IP1).
3. The Panel’s final Investigation Report dated 1 July 2014, wherein the cumulative impacts have now been moved to Chapter 2, which was sent to Bank Management for their response, and to the consultants in confidence on 3 July 2014 (referred to as IP2).
4. The Management Report and Recommendation in response dated 13August 2014, where the cumulative impacts have been relegated to a sub-section ‘A’ in Section IV, along with my comments dated 13 September 2014 (henceforth MR1).
5. A Summary of Management Actions that was submitted to the Board on 26 September 2014, for the Board’s meeting on 30 September 2014 (henceforth MR2).
6. The First Progress Report on Implementation by Management of the Action Plan dated 28 October 2015 (henceforth MR3).
If one pursues the progress of the Panel’s investigation through these reports, then it is clear that the contents have changed significantly in the two years between August 2013 and October 2015. I shall here refer only to the section on Cumulative Impacts that concerns me as a consultant hired for that specific purpose.
1. Cumulative Impacts
In my first draft (DR1) I had recommended that “Bank policy requires a Regional Environment Assessment for multiple projects”. This recommendation was accepted until the Panel’s draft (IP1) with the Panel’s finding that “the Project did not meet Bank requirements to assess and respond to the potential cumulative impacts of the Project”. But within a year the Panel’s Investigation Report (IP2) completely overturned this finding with “Panel finds that Management complied with OP/BP 4.01 by … a cumulative impact assessment of the project and increased minimum environmental flow… (although) Panel notes that extent to which the cumulative impact assessments influenced other aspects of Project design is not clear”. I had strongly objected to this by commenting on the Management Report (MR1) that, “Firstly, the THDC EA report was NOT a ‘cumulative’ impact assessment, but a ‘consolidated’ one. Secondly, the Mott MacDonald report does identify the fragmentation of the river as a serious impact. Thirdly, the e-flow given by the IITR study is 22.01 cumec. Fourthly the IMG report bases itself on the WII study which has an e-flow range from 12.35 cumec in the lean season to 78.19 cumec in the high flow season. Finally, OP 4.01 has NO provision for ‘cumulative’ assessments, only for ‘regional’ or ‘sectoral’ one”. However, my objection was ignored and the Action Plan (MR2) merely accepted that “Management will continue to pursue policy dialogue on river basin management with GOI and concerned States”. Even this concession finds no place in the Progress Report (MR3).
2. Changes in river flow and impacts of flushing of sediments on downstream ecology
In the first draft (DR1) I had noted that the ‘No project’ scenario in the EIA did not estimate the value of a free-flowing river, that the minimum flow requirement was not reflected in the flow of 3m3/sec, and that due diligence had not been conducted on 15m3/sec. These observations had been accepted in the Panel’s draft (IP1) with “Panel finds a lack of adequate analysis, and corresponding steps to avoid and reduce potential adverse cumulative impact, and this does not comply with OP4.01… Panel observes the analysis is deficient in impacts on aquatic ecology for the entire Alaknanda basin with full complement of proposed dams”. In the subsequent report (IP2) this was diluted by the Panel to “the impact of the sediments that enter the river bed through the quarterly flushing operations of this Project, and the cumulative impacts of flushing of additional HEPs on the Alaknanda river, is an issue that may require monitoring and additional study”. Again, I had objected strongly to the Management Report (MR1) with the words, “The emphasis here is on the impact of bedloads on the project, and not of the impact on the river and its ecology. In particular the cumulative impact would depend not on the damping character of the upstream dams but the impact of the bedload releases when these dams begin flushing the bedload collected upstream of them into the river bed downstream”. But in the Action Plan (MR2) my objections were not heeded and it was declared that “THDC would conduct studies and design a silt management system. The CAT plan is to be implemented over the next 5 years and physical measures put in place to limit bedload impact on VPHEP”. Implementation of these actions though does not find any mention in the Progress Report (MR3).
3. Drilling, blasting, tunneling
The first draft (DR1) stated that it was “not clear whether impact has been taken into account”. The Panel accepted this finding in its draft Report (IP1) with the observation that “one-fourth to one-third of the river length could be impacted by flow diversion, and the cumulative impacts from drilling, blasting, and tunneling have not been factored in”. But there is a complete U-turn in the Panel’s subsequent Investigation Report (IP2): “Panel observes that cumulative impact has been considered in the Bank’s 2009 cumulative impact assessment and the Roorkee cumulative impact assessment”. Once again, I had noted my objections to the Management Report (MR1) saying that “This section does not refer to mitigation measures for slurry leakages, slurry blowouts, and encounters with fractures and water while mining – all of which have greater significance in the fragile Himalayan geology”. The Management’s Action Plan (MR2) negated this objection with “the Contractor has agreed to a systematic protocol, under supervision of THDC and independent Third Party Monitoring Consultants, to regularly test the slurry for heavy metal or hazardous substances and treat the slurry as needed”. This action too does not find any mention in the Progress Report (MR3).
4. Benefits and losses
My draft (DR1) clearly noted that there was no analysis of this issue whereas OP4.01, Annex B required analysis of alternatives, with impacts and economic values included. The Panel too agreed in its final draft (IP1) that it “considers that it would have been both appropriate under Bank Policy and beneficial to carry out a Sectoral or Regional EA for the Project”. Strangely, this issue goes missing from the Panel’s Investigation Report (IP2) and the Management Report (MR1), reappears in the Action Plan (MR2) with a promise of 12% free power to the State, and then disappears again in the Progress Report (MR3).
5. Transmission lines
Initially, I reported (DR1) that there was nothing in either the EIA or EMP about the environmental or social aspects of the transmission lines; in its final draft (IP1) the Panel agreed that “inattention to potentially significant impacts of the transmission lines is not consistent with Bank Policy”; and repeated in the Investigation Report (IP2) that, “Panel notes that studies do not address the issue and emphasizes need for clarification”. The issue disappeared from the Management Response (MR1), only to reappear in the Action Plan (MR2) with the assurance that “Management will ensure they are properly implemented and impacts are mitigated”; but the Progress Report (MR3) ignores it completely.
6. Fish biodiversity
The first draft (DR1) notes “there is no analysis of impact of reduced fish biodiversity on the local people”. The Panel draft (IP1) is even more specific, mentioning that “fragmentation of the river flow through a series of dams and diversions may not only affect fish biodiversity, but also water quality, nutrients, sediments, eutrophication, and fish migration; there has been inadequate attention paid by the Bank to mitigating these impacts by reviewing them in a regional and/or cumulative manner”. But in the Investigation Report (IR2), while repeating the observation on fragmentation, the Panel retreats from its earlier position by conceding the impacts “have been studied in the cumulative assessments, and as a result, the environmental flow regime for the Project was increased”. This allows Management to refrain from mentioning the issue in either the Management Response (MR1) or the Action Plan (MR2) or the Progress Report (MR3).
7. Climate change
My draft report (DR1) stated that no studies had been conducted on climate impacts of these projects. The Panel reversed this in its draft report (IR1) to note that “Management’s concerns have been directed towards whether climate change poses an additional risk to dams”; and then did another U-turn in the Investigation Report (IR2) to note that “in general hydropower provides a clean source of energy which may reduce dependence on coal thereby reducing carbon emissions”. Such a position enabled Management to conveniently avoid mentioning the issue in any of its subsequent three reports (MR1, MR2, & MR3).
8. Roads, traffic, and landslides
In my report (DR1) I stated clearly that neither the ADB plan nor the Mott MacDonald study, nor the proposal to bring in a TMB, had conducted any impact assessments on roads etc. The Panel, in its daft report (IR1), agreed that “the cumulative impacts have not been adequately considered”. Subsequently, however, the issue finds no mention in the Investigation Report (IR2) or any of the Management reports (MR1, MR2, & MR3).
9. Reservoir effects
In my draft (DR1) I found no data on the impact of the reservoir on stagnation, oxygen depletion, negative impacts on health and the upstream land. The Panel initially observed (IR1) “various studies suggest significant stretches of the river would be converted into reservoirs, but impacts have not been treated with due diligence”. Then, unaccountably, the issue does not figure in the Panel’s Investigation Report (IR2) allowing Management to evade the issue in its reports (MR1, MR2, & MR3).
I should mention here two other important facets:
– After my draft report (DR1) had been submitted to the Panel, I was asked to provide more detailed observations and findings on Risk from storm events, Estimation of (the joy) of a free-flowing river; Impact of flushing with high sediment concentration, Impact of damming and diversion on local sources; Fish biodiversity; Drilling, blasting, and tunneling; Reservoir effects; Climate change; and Assessment of costs and benefits for local people. This I had duly submitted in the form of an Addenda note on 23 January 2014, well before the Panel’s draft Report came out on 28 February 2014.
– Secondly, I consulted all the environment assessment reports that the Panel did, including the reports of Matt MacDonald, Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee, Wildlife Institute of India, Inter-Ministerial Group, World Wildlife Fund for Nature, and the International Water Management Institute, and my report (DR1) summarized the findings of all these reports in great detail. It also showed how none of these reports met the “Bank’s policy that requires a Regional Environmental Assessment for cumulative impact assessment of all multiple ongoing or proposed projects and activities, which may influence an evolving development strategy or plan of the entire Basin”.
When it became obvious from Management Response (MR1) of 13 August 2014 and the Joint Statement from Management and Panel issued on 2 October 2014, that my analysis was not accepted by the Panel, I expressed my unhappiness over email on 5 October 2014 to the Panel. The Panel chair was gracious enough to reply on 9 October 2014 saying that “Consultants to the Panel, as I am sure you are aware, are expected to provide the Panel with their professional technical opinion (in confidence) on the matters under consideration, but in the final analysis it is the Panel that makes the decisions regarding compliance and non-compliance findings.”
I replied immediately, “as a professional consultant I think I have a right to know what were the requirements and facts (and, more importantly, the arguments – that were not there in the February final draft) that the Panel depended upon and what was their assessment and judgment of these requirements and facts (and arguments) to arrive at the set of findings that are spelt out in the final Report”. The Panel Secretariat was kind enough to then arrange a teleconference with the Panel on 24 October 2014. At this teleconference I was told that the Panel took the decision to state that the Bank was in compliance with OP4.01 because of the “strategic reason to keep engaging with the Bank as the Management has now to report back to the Board to tell them what further measures they are taking to mitigate possible impacts as well as maintain e-flows”.
As I wrote back to the Secretariat after the teleconference was over, the discussion did not “really address my concerns. A tactical choice to engage the Bank in a discussion so that future changes may be possible does not take away from the basic issue of compliance with the specific Safeguard”. But I decided at that time to respect the argument of the Panel that this strategic move would now encourage Management to take specific measures to mitigate impacts and maintain e-flows.
However, after waiting for a year, the Progress Report of 28 October 2015 makes it amply clear that Bank Management is only concerned with two issues:– (i) Water loss and alternative water sources; and (ii) Resettlement and livelihood restoration. I am at a loss to understand how the Panel’s ‘strategy’ is working out to enforce compliance, especially since the Panel is supposed to be an independent oversight agency.
In conclusion, I wish to state that I have worked as a short-term environment consultant for the Bank for over 20 years now and this is the first time that my professional opinion has been disregarded. I therefore, repeat my request of last year to the Panel: that either the Panel’s Investigation Report should record that I do not agree with the Panel’s views and hence my name is removed from any association with the Report, or I should be set at liberty to publicly state my independent and dissenting views.
I look forward to an early reply from the Panel.
Sincerely
A K (Dunu) Roy
